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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 
vs . 
ONAN FORD, 
Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Supreme Court No. 880299 
Category 2 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a jury conviction of Aggravated 
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, Utah Code Ann. 76-6-302 (1975), 
in the Second Judicial District Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(1988) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in denying 
Defendant's pre-trial Motion to Quash the Line-Up. 
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in denying 
Defendant's pre-trial Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial 
Misconduct. 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. 76-6-302 (1975): 
"(1) A person commits Aggravated Robbery if in the 
course of committing a robbery he: 
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(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, 
knife or a facsimile of a knife, or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated Robbery is a felony of the first 
degree . 
(3) For the purpose of this part and act shall be 
deemed to be 'in the course of committing a robbery1 if 
it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery." 
Rules 
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2. Communication 
with Person Represented by Counsel: 
"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate about the subject of the representation 
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by 
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to 
do so." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant ONAN FORD was charged by Information with 
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. 76-6-302 (1975) (R. 1). 
Defendant was initially arraigned in Circuit Court on 
January 12, 1988, with Public Defendant Robert L. Froerer 
representing him as counsel (R. 3). Defendant's preliminary 
hearing was held on January 21, 1988, and Defendant was bound 
over to District Court for arraignment. On January 29, 1988, 
Stephen Laker, Public Defender, standing in for Robert L. 
Froerer, appeared with Defendant at his arraignment in District 
Court. The arraignment was continued for one week to February 5, 
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1988, at which time Merlin Calver, an attorney hired by 
Defendant, appeared as counsel for Defendant, and Defendant's 
Not Guilty plea was entered. The Defendant, through Mr. Calver, 
then filed several pre-trial Motions, among them a Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 57) accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 221) and 
Attorney's Affidavit in Support (R. 53) and Defendant's Affidavit 
in Support (R. 62). Defendant also filed a Motion to Quash 
Lineup (R. 19) and Memorandum in Support (R. 20) . 
Mr. Calver subsequently withdrew as counsel for 
Defendant on April 21, 1988 (R. 97). On April 22, 1988, a 
hearing was held to obtain a new trial setting and for a report 
on Defendant's new counsel. This hearing was continued to April 
29, 1988, on Defendant's request to obtain private counsel (R. 
89). On April 29, 1988, Robert L. Froerer of the Weber County 
Public Defender Association entered as counsel for Defendant, and 
the trial date of June 7, 1988, was set (R. 93). 
Defendant, through Attorney Robert L. Froerer, then 
filed two additional Motions, one of which was to recuse the 
Weber County Attorney's office and appoint a special prosector 
(R. 128) along with a Memorandum in support of such Motion (R. 
123). A hearing on Defendant's pre-trial Motions was held on 
June 7 and 8, 1988 (R. 130-134, 748, 787, 858), in which all of 
Defendant's pre-trial Motions were denied. 
Defendant was convicted in a trial by jury held on June 
29 and 30, 1988, in the Second Judicial District Court, the 
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Honorable David E. Roth presiding (R. 245). On June 30, 1988, 
Judge Roth sentenced Defendant to the Utah State Prison for a 
term not less than five years and which may be for life (R. 283)• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Section One 
On January 11, 1988, at approximately 6:00 p.m., a 
black male entered a business called Gas-N-Go (R. 321-322). Mr. 
Garcia, a clerk at Gas-N-Go, described the black male as about 
five feet five inches, wearing a green jacket, a red scarf, and a 
gray hat. The scarf was covering half his face, and he had 
light brown pants on and was wearing white tennis shoes (R. 
323). The gray hat was a pullover hat, covering his ears and 
leaving just a little bit of hair showing (R. 324). This same 
black male brought up to the counter a box of Reynolds Wrap (R. 
325-327), which was still on the counter after he left (R. 332), 
and pulled out a small handgun, pointing it toward an employee of 
the business, John Garcia, and asked Mr. Garcia to give him all 
the money he had (R. 327). In opening the cash register, Mr. 
Garcia activated an alarm (R. 329). After taking money from the 
till, the suspect allegedly turned and left the store toward the 
east on Patterson Avenue (R. 331)• 
Officer Hugh Miller of the Ogden City Police Department 
followed footprints which he suspected were those of the suspect 
in the robbery and followed them to a residence located at 3237 
Jefferson Avenue, Ogden, Utah (R. 362-367). At such residence, 
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he obtained information from some juveniles that their parents 
and two other adults had left in a blue vehicle (R. 367 and 368). 
Subsequently, a vehicle was stopped near the residence at 3237 
Jefferson by Officer Stewart (R. 370 and 396). The Defendant was 
removed from the vehicle, and it was determined that his shoes 
matched the footprints observed in the snow (R. 396). 
Defendant was transported to the police department (R. 
397), and while there, Defendant was required to participate in a 
lineup, which was called a "show-up" by police officers (R. 336, 
375). The lineup in which the Defendant participated was made up 
of only three suspects (R. 374). After the Defendant was 
identified by Mr. Garcia from the Gas-N-Go business (R. 336 and 
374), the three suspects in the lineup were also asked to speak 
for purposes of making a voice identification (R. 337 and 375). 
Defendant was subsequently booked for Aggravated Robbery (R. 
377) . 
Section Two 
A hearing was held on June 8, 1988, on Defendant's 
Motion to Quash a Lineup in which he had been identified as the 
perpetrator of the Aggravated Robbery occurring at the Gas~N-Go 
business (R. 336, 375). Prior to and during the lineup 
procedure, Defendant made several requests to have his attorney 
present (R. 788, 790, 791, 793, and 805). All of Defendant's 
requests were denied (R., 788-790). The Defendant testified that 
he was placed in a room with two other males (R. 789) for 
purposes of allowing the witness to attempt to identify the 
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perpetrator of the Aggravated Robbery. One of the other lineup 
suspects testified that he was asked to be in a lineup; not a 
show-up, but a lineup (R. 804). 
Though there were three people involved as suspects in 
this identification process, at least one of them was 
signficantly different in appearance from the Defendant, being 
described as a lighter fellow, yellow-skinned, short, with an 
Afro (R. 802, 806). 
Police Officer Spence Phillips, the shift manager at 
time, who was also in charge of the lineup procedure, testified 
that the procdure he called a show-up highly resembled a lineup 
procedure (R. 828). He further testified that the procedure was 
not tape recorded, that no photographs were taken, and that none 
of the suspects had an attorney present (R. 828). When asked 
whether or not the case would have been prejudiced by allowing 
additional time for tape recording, photographing, and getting an 
attorney for the Defendant, Officer Phillips agreed that no harm 
would have occurred (R. 829). However, because the police had a 
lot of calls that evening, Officer Phillips stated, "...I was 
trying to get this thing over so I could get officers back on the 
air." (R. 829). The officer further stated that a tape recorder 
was unavailable, but that one could have been obtained within a 
half hour to an hour's time (R. 829, 830). 
Section Three 
Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, based on 
prosecutorial misconduct, the facts are as follows: 
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In February of 1988/ Defendant retained Merlin Calver 
to represent him in the charges involved in this case (h\ h45J . 
Prior to retaining Mr, Calver as private counsel, Defendant was 
represented by an attorney from the Weber County Public Defenders 
Association. 
Sometime after the Defendant retained Mr. Calver, 
Officer Norman Soakai of the Ogden City Police Department was 
contacted by Defendant from the jail (R. 547, 548). Defendant 
and Detective Soakai discussed the possibilities of trading 
information Defendant had learned while in jail about another 
case in exchange for a deal on his own case (R. 552, 553). The 
Defendant requested that, in exchange for his information he be 
placed in a county jail or halfway house as opposed to prison (R. 
554) . 
Detective Soakai and Detective Lucas then commenced 
communications between the Defendant and attorneys in the Weber 
County Attorney's office: Reed Richards, County Attorney, and 
Gary Heward, Deputy County Attorney, with the detectives acting 
as message carriers (R. 555-557, 559, 694-695). 
Through negotiations with the prosecutor and without 
counsel, Defendant understood that, in exchange for giving 
information about the Jeff Scott case, he would be placed in a 
halfway house (R. 716-717, 732). The County Attorney, Reed 
Richards, Deputy County Attorney, Gary Heward, and police 
detectives met with the Defendant in the jail to present the 
State's written offer to the Defendant (R. 601, 665-666) (see 
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Addendum, Exhibit 1). However, Defendant did not fully 
understand it (R. 650, 718, 721) and didn't even completely read 
it, for as he stated, "I heard what I wanted to hear. Yes, we 
can arrange for you to go to a halfway house." (R. 736). 
During this meeting, Defendant was asked by Mr. Heward if he was 
going to plead guilty, to which inquiry Defendant responded, "No" 
(R. 742). At some point in time, Defendant asked if he shouldn't 
review the matter with his attorney, Mr. Calver , but he was 
specifically instructed by the detectives not to call Mr. Calver 
until "all this is over with." (R. 176-177, 191). 
At some point in time, Defendant gave Detective Lucas a 
statement of what he knew concerning the Jeff Scott case 
(Addendum, Exhibit 2). Defendant stated in his taped statement, 
"I'm hoping that the county attorney will read it...and work 
some kind of deal with me" (Defendant's last answer, Addendum, 
Exhibit 2). 
Shortly thereafter, a body transmitter was placed on 
Defendant (R. 612) to monitor a conversation between Defendant 
and Jeff Scott's attorney, Randine Salerno. The idea to monitor 
the conversation was derived by the detectives and approved by 
the Weber County Attorney "to see if she would accept more 
diamonds in the jail" (R. 594-595). 
Attorney Salerno's office was contacted by another 
Ogden City Detective, Detective Chesser, who left a message with 
Ms. Salerno's secretary that Mr. Ford was in need of legal 
services and requested her presence as soon as possible (R. 614 
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and 620). Shortly thereafter, Ms. Salerno arrived at the jail, 
and a discussion then ensued between her and Defendant in a way 
that it appeared that Mr. Ford was attempting to hire Ms. 
Salerno. They discussed facts of his case in great detail, 
incriminating statements were made by the Defendant, and costs 
for representation were discussed (R. 621-622, 626-628) . The 
entire conversation was taped and monitored by detectives from 
the Ogden City Police Department (R. 607, 622). Kristine 
Knowlton, an attorney from the Weber County Attorney1s Office, 
then listened to the tape (R. 707), and the County Attorney 
himself listened to a portion of the tape (R. 705) and may have 
been privy to a great deal of information contained therein. 
Two attorneys who had dealt with Mr. Ford during the 
events that transpired testified that Mr. Ford had difficulty 
understanding things at times and may have had a learning 
disability, and took a lot of time to think about questions and 
responding to them (R. 633-634, 640, 653-654) . 
After learning what had transpired without his 
knowledge, Defendant's attorney of choice, Merlin Calver, filed a 
complaint with the State Bar Association against Mr. Heward and 
Mrs. Richards, the Weber County prosecutors involved in this case 
(R. 645) (see Addendum, Exhibit 3). Mr. Calver subsequently 
withdrew from the Defendant's case due to the fact that he felt 
he had become ineffective counsel for Defendant for the following 
reasons: (1) he was feeling extremely uncomfortable due to the 
fact that the two prosecutors in the case were friends of his, 
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(2) he was having problems in getting discovery and getting the 
case positioned properly, due to his complaint to the bar (R. 
645), and (3) he felt he might be a witness in the case and would 
not, therefore, be able to act as counsel (R. 645-647). 
Mr. Calver testified that, in his experience as a 
defense attorney, that the plea negotiation offered to Defendant 
was not as advantageous as he may have been able to have obtained 
with the help of an attorney, and that he could not negotiate 
effectively in the position he had been placed in by the 
circumstances (R, 648, 650-651). Mr. Calver further testified 
that, as an experienced defense attorney, it was his opinion that 
Mr. Ford was denied his right to have an attorney when he was 
asked to sign a certain document by police officers (R. 656), and 
that the taped conversation made of the conversation between 
Defendant and Attorney Salerno listened to by police and 
prosecutors did, in fact, contain many statements that were 
incriminatory and against the Defendants interest (R. 659). 
Even after the Defendant learned from his attorney, 
Mr, Calver, that the deal was not what Defendant thought it was, 
he still testified as a witness for the State in the Jeff Scott 
matter, due to the fact that he felt that he had to or the State 
would file criminal charges against his girl friend, Robin, for 
receiving stolen property (R. 722, 732). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Defendant contends that the lower Court erred in 
-13-
denying his pre-trial Motions (1) to quash the lineup and (2) to 
dismiss based on prosecutorial misconduct resulting in 
Defendant's receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
QUASH THE LINEUP* 
Utah Code Ann. §77-8-2 provides that "a suspect has the 
right to have an attorney present at any lineup" and further, 
"that every suspect that is unable to employ counsel shall be 
entitled to representation by an attorney appointed by a 
magistrate for a lineup, either before or after an arrest" 
[emphasis added]. 
There are further requirements dealing with lineups 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-8-4 as follows: "The entire 
procedure shall be recorded, including all conversations between 
the witnesses and the conducting peace officers. The suspect 
shall have access to and may make copies of the record and any 
photographs taken of him or any other person in connection with 
the lineup." 
In the case before us, the Defendant, ONAN FORD, was, 
indeed, subjected to a lineup. He was placed in a room with two 
other people, ordered to stand and turn at various angles, and 
make a statement (R. 826) so that the witness, John Garcia, could 
attempt to identify the suspect in an alleged robbery which had 
occurred previously that night. Prior to being subjected to the 
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lineup, the Defendant made several requests for representation of 
an attorney (R. 788, 790, 791, 793, 805) and such requests should 
immediately have been granted. The State should not have gone 
forward with the lineup prior to counsel being present. 
The State argues that there is a distinction between a 
"show-up" and a "lineup," and that this was a showup, which does 
not require as many safeguards for a suspect. However, ample 
evidence exists indicating that what Defendant was subjected to 
was a lineup (R. 828). The Defendant was in the custody of the 
police at the police station; the Defendant was placed in a room 
with other individuals; the witness was brought to the police 
station for identification of the suspect; the witness was not 
injured nor harmed in any way; the witness was in the presence of 
a police officer; Defendant was requested to make statements that 
may have been incriminating for purposes of voice identification; 
there was no recording of the proceedings nor photographs taken; 
there were no apparent exigent circumstances requiring an 
immediate lineup, nor was there any foreseeable reason the 
Defendant's statutory and constitutional right to an attorney 
could not have been upheld (R. 828) . 
The State has violated the Rules of Utah Criminal 
Procedure pertaining to the proper conducting of lineups and the 
Defendant's right to have counsel present at a lineup, even 
before an arrest (U.C.A. §77-8-2) [emphasis added]. Even the 
officer in charge of the lineup stated that no harm to the 
State's case would have resulted by delaying long enough to get 
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an attorney for Defendant (R. 829) . 
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 18 L.Ed.2d 
1149, 87 Supreme Ct 1926 (1967) , the Supreme Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires that absent an 
intelligent waiver, both an accused and his counsel be notified 
of an impending police lineup and counsel be present at the 
lineup where the lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution. 
Although the Wade case dealt with a post-indictment lineup, the 
requirements contained in this case should apply when there is no 
showing of immediate prejudice occurring by granting a suspect 
additional time in which to have counsel present and safeguard 
the reliability of the proceedings, particularly in light of the 
statutory right of a suspect to have counsel present at a lineup 
before an arrest, Utah Code Ann. 77-8-2 [emphasis added]. 
Because Defendant's rights while a suspect in a lineup 
have been seriously violated, this case should be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. An order should also 'be made 
suppressing all tainted evidence. 
Point Two 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS DUE TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
...In conducting a trial, a prosecutor is bound only 
by the general rules of law and professional ethics that bind all 
counsel." 63 AmJr. 2d, Prosecuting Attorneys, §3. 
"A district attorney or his associate may not 
communicate with a defendant who is represented by counsel, even 
though the defendant has approached the district attorney.., ff 
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Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct, N. Carolina Bar Opinion 
30, April 16, 1987. 
"A state prosecutor may not communicate with a 
defendant without the knowledge and consent of the defendant's 
lawyer, even though the defendant has requested the interview." 
Supra, Tenn. Opinion 87-F-112, Sept. 28, 1987. 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed solely on the 
basis that the Weber County Attorney's Office violated the 
Professional Rules of Conduct, Rule 4.2 (see supra). 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall...have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The 
United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Morrison, 449 
U.S. 361, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), discusses the effect of 
prosecution interference with the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel of a defendant. The Morrison case states that a showing 
of demonstrable prejudice is required in order to require 
dismissal of the indictment. Morrison, 449 US 366, 66 L.Ed. 2d 
569. In Mr. Ford's case, a demonstrable prejudice resulting 
from the violation of Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel has indeed occurred. It has been held that such 
prejudice is present when, among other things, government action 
destroys defendant's confidence in his attorney and when the 
prosecution takes other actions designed to give it unfair 
advantage. See U.S. v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182. 
In Mr. Ford's case, the prosecution and police actions 
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have denied the Defendant his right to counsel in negotiating a 
plea bargain (or sentencing concession), by their contact with 
Defendant alone. Defendant was prejudiced, in that substantial 
information was obtained from Defendant about Defendant's own 
case, when Defendant, without the advice of counsel, participated 
in the attempted sting operation which was conducted by the 
police and approved by the County Attorney (R. 594-595) against 
attorney Randine Salerno. 
Defendant's case was further prejudiced and counsel 
rendered ineffective by the fact that Defendant's counsel, Merlin 
Calver, reported the conduct of the Weber County Attorney's 
Office to the Utah State Bar Association (R. 647) (Addendum, 
Exhibit 3). By filing such complaint there developed prejudcie 
or presumed prejudice on the part of the County Attorney's Office 
against this Defendant's attorney and, therefor, arguably against 
this Defendant, in that communication and cooperation between 
defense counsel and the County Attorney's Office had broken down 
(R. 651). Based upon this breakdown of communication, the 
Defendant was denied his right to effective counsel, perhaps 
permanently, no matter which attorney was to handle the case. 
Due to Mr. Calver's ineffectiveness, he withdrew from the matter 
(R. 97) and therefore Defendant's trial date was delayed, all 
because of the County Attorney's Office's failure to honor 
Defendant's right to counsel. 
In an earlier case, the Washington State Supreme Court 
held that Defendant has a constitutional right to have counsel 
-18-
present during the course of plea negotiation, State v. Johnson, 
596 P.2d 308 (Wash., 1979). In the Johnson case there were 
negotiations which were found to have taken place outside the 
scope of Defendant's counsel's involvement, which the Washington 
Supreme Court found to be a direct violation of the Defendant's 
constitutional right to have counsel present at all crucial 
stages of the criminal proceeding. The Washington Supreme Court 
has also held that the defendant is entitled to counsel in plea 
negotiations and in the plea process under the Sixth Amendment 
and Article I, Section 22, of the Washington State Constitution. 
See State v. Wendon, 607 P.2d 852 (Wash., 1980). 
In Defendant's case, there were negotiations for 
sentencing concessions between police officers and the Weber 
County Attorney's Office directly with the Defendant, ONAN FORD 
(R. 555-557, 559, 601, 665-666, 694-695, 716-717, 732, 742). In 
the Michigan case of People v. Green, 174 N.W.2d 448 (Michigan, 
1979), the Michigan Court held that, "Where proscecuting attorney 
accompanied police and detective on visit with defendant at jail 
and asked accused if he was telling the truth, after defendant, 
in response to questions propounded mainly by detective, 
proceeded to tell exculpatory story, prosecuting attorney 
violated disciplinary rules prohibiting direct communication with 
adverse party, despite the fact that the defendant requested the 
visit and waived his right to have his attorney present." See 
also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), 
in which plea bargaining has been recognized as an essential 
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component of the administration of justice. 
The actions of the law enforcement officials and 
prosecutorfs office constitute a blatant disregard for 
Defendant's rights pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution guaranteeing the right of defendant to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
Because in this case on this issue actions by the 
prosecutors and their agents effectively removed the possibility 
of Defendant having effective assistance of counsel, this case 
should be reversed and dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing issues and arguments, and a 
thorough review of the evidence and law pertaining thereto, 
Defendant respectfully requests a reversal of his conviction or, 
in the alternative, remanded for a new trial with suppression of 
evidence as required. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /3 day of February, 1989. 
(KUN A*iS*~— 
ROBERT L. FROERER 
Attorney for Defendant 
Certificate ol Mailiny 
I hereby certify that on the February, 
1989, I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney for Respondent, 
at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
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